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Media	summary	13	 In	many	animal	societies,	only	one	or	a	few	individuals	breed,	while	others	help	to	raise	14	 their	offspring.	Traditionally,	individuals	were	thought	to	help	because	breeding	alone	15	 was	their	only	alternative	–	an	often	unfeasible	task.	However,	we	now	show	that	paper	16	 wasp	helpers	have	other	options:	they	can	start	new	groups	with	other	partners	or	join	17	 neighbouring	groups	where	they	have	good	chances	of	becoming	breeders	themselves.	18	 Helpers	thus	have	options	that	give	higher	evolutionary	fitness	than	breeding	alone.	19	 Traditional	cooperative	theory	therefore	overestimates	the	incentives	for	helping,	and	20	 biological	market	theory,	which	incorporates	partner	choice,	may	be	more	appropriate.		 	21	
	 2	
Abstract	22	 A	major	aim	in	evolutionary	biology	is	to	understand	altruistic	help	and	reproductive	23	 partitioning	in	cooperative	societies,	where	subordinate	helpers	forego	reproduction	to	24	 rear	dominant	breeders’	offspring.	Traditional	models	of	cooperation	in	these	societies	25	 typically	make	a	key	assumption:	that	the	only	alternative	to	staying	and	helping	is	26	 solitary	breeding,	an	often	unfeasible	task.	Using	large-scale	field	experiments	on	paper	27	 wasps	(Polistes	dominula),	we	show	that	individuals	have	high	quality	alternative	28	 nesting	options	available	that	offer	fitness	payoffs	just	as	high	as	their	actual	chosen	29	 options,	far	exceeding	payoffs	from	solitary	breeding.	Furthermore,	joiners	could	not	30	 easily	be	replaced	if	they	were	removed	experimentally,	suggesting	that	it	may	be	costly	31	 for	dominants	to	reject	them.	Our	results	have	implications	for	expected	payoff	32	 distributions	for	cooperating	individuals	and	suggest	that	biological	market	theory,	33	 which	incorporates	partner	choice	and	competition	for	partners,	is	necessary	to	34	 understand	helping	behaviour	in	societies	like	P.	dominula.	Traditional	models	are	likely	35	 to	overestimate	the	incentive	to	stay	and	help	and	therefore	the	amount	of	help	36	 provided,	and	may	underestimate	the	size	of	reproductive	concession	required	to	retain	37	 subordinates.	These	findings	are	relevant	for	a	wide	range	of	cooperative	breeders	38	 where	there	is	dispersal	between	social	groups.		39	
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Introduction	43	 Altruistic	helping	behaviour	occurs	throughout	the	animal	kingdom	despite	costs	to	44	 helpers’	direct	fitness.	In	cooperatively	breeding	animals,	subordinates	care	for,	defend	45	 and	provision	the	offspring	of	dominant	breeders,	while	foregoing	or	delaying	their	own	46	 reproduction	(1,	2).	A	range	of	factors	has	been	identified	to	explain	the	evolution	and	47	 maintenance	of	this	phenomenon,	including	both	direct	fitness	benefits,	such	as	48	 inheritance	of	the	breeding	position	(3,	4),	and	indirect	fitness	benefits	obtained	49	 through	helping	a	relative	(5,	6).	However,	there	is	an	increasing	awareness	in	the	50	 literature	of	the	limitations	of	traditional	theoretical	models,	and	a	call	for	more	51	 complex	models	that	more	realistically	describe	the	social	environment	of	individuals	52	 (7-12).	Specifically,	traditional	models	predicting	the	level	of	help	and	reproductive	53	 skew	in	cooperative	breeders	often	make	a	key	assumption:	that	a	subordinate	helper’s	54	 only	alternative	to	staying	and	helping	in	its	current	group	is	to	leave	and	breed	55	 solitarily	(13-18).	However,	breeding	alone	is	often	unfeasible	or	highly	risky	(3,	19,	56	 20),	leading	to	the	prediction	that	subordinates	should	accept	a	high	workload	and	a	57	 small	share	or	zero	part	of	the	reproduction,	in	order	to	remain	in	the	group.		58	 Recent	literature	increasingly	suggests	that	in	order	to	correctly	estimate	the	59	 costs	and	benefits	associated	with	staying	and	helping	in	a	group,	one	must	compare	the	60	 payoffs	of	that	decision	with	an	individual’s	true	alternative	options	(7,	8,	11,	21).	In	61	 reality,	a	subordinate’s	alternative	options	may	include	switching	to	another	group	or	62	 recruiting	other	cooperative	partners	to	initiate	a	new	breeding	group	(11,	20,	22,	23).	63	 If	such	alternative	options	could	lead	to	higher	fitness	payoffs	than	solitary	breeding,	64	 payoff	distributions	may	have	been	miscalculated	in	past	studies,	overestimating	the	65	 incentive	for	subordinates	to	stay	and	help.	Hence,	future	studies	are	encouraged	to	66	 include	the	following:	partner	choice	rather	than	partner	control,	where	sanctioning	of	67	
	 4	
uncooperative	partners	is	replaced	by	partner	switching	(12,	23-25);	outside	options	68	 beyond	solitary	breeding	(9,	10);	asymmetric	relationships	where	the	exchange	of	69	 behaviours	is	more	valuable	for	one	of	the	parties	(21,	26,	27);	and	N-player	70	 interactions	not	achievable	in	traditional	2-player	cooperative	games	(21,	28).	These	71	 modifications	can	be	achieved	by	invoking	biological	market	models	(21).	Biological	72	 market	theory	predicts	that	competition	for	cooperative	partners	will	affect	the	value	of	73	 commodities	exchanged	between	individuals	of	different	trader	classes	(9,	10).	In	74	 cooperative	breeders,	subordinates	may	be	seen	as	effectively	exchanging	helping	75	 behaviour	for	group	membership	(15,	29,	30),	and	the	value	of	helping	behaviour	may	76	 therefore	be	affected	by	the	supply	of	and	demand	for	help	in	the	market.	Subordinates	77	 may	be	described	as	‘paying-to-stay’	(30-32)	or	dominants	as	‘paying-for-help’	(33,	34),	78	 depending	on	which	commodity	is	in	focus.	For	example,	when	there	is	competition	79	 among	dominants	for	a	limited	supply	of	helpers	so	that	help	is	in	high	demand,	80	 dominants	may	be	willing	to	accept	subordinates	paying	less	for	group	membership	81	 through	reducing	their	work	efforts.	Similarly,	dominants	might	be	willing	to	pay	more	82	 for	help	by	granting	a	higher	share	of	reproduction	to	subordinates	(9,	10,	22,	33,	34).		83	 Several	studies	of	cooperatively	breeding	mammals	(31,	33,	34),	fishes	(32,	35,	84	 36),	birds	(30,	37,	38)	and	insects	(22)	have	found	support	for	the	concept	that	85	 dominants	and	subordinates	exchange	commodities	as	described	above.	In	the	86	 cooperatively	breeding	paper	wasp,	Polistes	dominula,	we	previously	reported	data	87	 consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	dominants	have	to	accept	a	lower	payment	from	88	 their	subordinates	when	competition	for	help	is	increased	in	the	population	(22).	We	89	 first	showed	that	wasps	had	outside	options	and	a	choice	of	cooperative	partners.	We	90	 then	experimentally	increased	the	amount	of	outside	options	available	to	subordinates	91	 and	found	that	subordinates,	as	a	result,	decreased	their	work	efforts	(22).	These	92	
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results	suggest	that	there	is	a	biological	market	in	this	species	where	the	supply	of	93	 outside	options	affect	the	exchange	of	cooperative	behaviours	within	groups.	However,	94	 in	order	to	wholly	understand	the	dynamics	between	dominants	and	subordinates,	we	95	 need	to	know	not	only	the	number	of	alternative	options	available	but	also	their	quality.	96	 Only	by	evaluating	the	attractiveness	of	outside	options	will	the	behavioural	decisions	97	 of	cooperative	partners	be	clear.	Here,	we	quantify	the	outside	options	available	to	P.	98	
dominula	wasps	and	estimate	the	fitness	payoffs	associated	with	these	options.	We	99	 further	evaluate	how	partner	choice	may	affect	the	payoff	distribution	between	100	 cooperative	partners,	and	assess	the	implications	this	may	have	for	cooperative	theory.		101	 The	nesting	behaviour	and	social	organisation	of	P.	dominula	is	well	studied,	and	102	 our	study	sites	offer	large	samples	of	small	groups	(8,	22,	39).	At	these	sites,	thousands	103	 of	mated	females	from	the	same	generation	emerge	simultaneously	from	hibernation	in	104	 early	spring	and	found	hundreds	of	nests	along	cactus	hedges	(Opuntia	ficus-indica).	105	 Groups	of	typically	fewer	than	10	females	and	small	numbers	(~6.4%	of	all	females	in	106	 (40))	of	solitary	breeders	rear	workers	that	mature	during	late	spring	and	early	107	 summer.	Here	we	focus	on	the	pre-worker	stage	where	groups	of	similar-aged	females	108	 live	as	cooperative	breeders.	The	dominant	breeder	lays	all	or	most	of	the	eggs,	while	109	 subordinates	build	and	expand	the	nest,	forage	and	help	care	for	the	offspring	of	the	110	 dominant	(41).	Nest	residents	often	consist	of	genetically	related	individuals	(sisters	111	 and	cousins),	but	a	significant	proportion	of	subordinates	are	unrelated	to	the	dominant	112	 they	are	helping	(42-44).	The	chance	of	inheriting	the	breeding	position	or	obtaining	a	113	 small	share	of	the	reproduction	has	been	used	to	explain	the	presence	of	unrelated	114	 helpers	in	this	species:	Leadbeater	et	al	(2011)	found	that	the	amount	of	direct	fitness	115	 obtained	as	a	subordinate	was	greater	than	through	solitary	breeding	(3).	However,	if	116	 helpers	have	alternative	options	available	that	offer	higher	fitness	payoffs	than	solitary	117	
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breeding,	the	incentive	to	stay	and	help	in	their	current	groups	may	previously	have	118	 been	overestimated.	119	 	 We	ask	the	following	questions:	i)	Do	available	nesting	options	include	high-120	 payoff	alternatives?	Alternative	options	will	affect	the	predictions	of	existing	models	121	 only	if	they	offer	a	higher	payoff	than	solitary	nesting;	ii)	Do	alternative	options	differ	122	 from	observed	choices	in	ways	that	should	affect	direct	and	indirect	fitness,	such	as	123	 inheritance	rank	and	relatedness	to	the	dominant?	We	predict	that	alternative	options	124	 are	inferior	to	observed	choices:	in	a	biological	market,	individuals	are	expected	to	125	 assess	their	options	and	make	the	choice	that	offers	the	highest	payoff	(10);	iii)	Is	it	126	 costly	for	dominants	to	reject	an	additional	cooperative	partner?	We	expect	help	to	be	127	 in	high	demand	because	productivity	and	group	survival	increase	with	the	number	of	128	 helpers	in	P.	dominula	(3,	22),	so	we	predict	that	rejecting	a	joiner	represents	a	cost	to	129	 dominant	breeders.			130	
Methods		131	
Study	species,	field	site	and	handling	of	animals	132	
Polistes	dominula	is	a	primitively	eusocial	(cooperatively-breeding)	wasp	lacking	133	 morphological	castes.	At	our	field	site,	females	from	the	same	generation	found	nests	in	134	 early	spring	after	overwintering.	The	first	female	offspring	to	mature	in	late	spring	135	 become	workers	and	those	maturing	during	summer	mate	and	overwinter,	to	restart	136	 the	cycle	next	spring	(3).		137	 Experiments	were	carried	out	in	a	rural	area	in	Southern	Spain,	close	to	Conil	de	138	 la	Frontera,	Cadiz	(N	36°17’10.9’’	W	6°03’57.8’’)	(3,	22)	during	two	field	seasons:	139	 March-May	2013	and	2014.	We	tagged	and	numbered	a	total	of	~700	nests:	~475	nests	140	 in	two	subpopulations	in	2013	and	~225	nests	in	2014	from	one	subpopulation	(Fig	1,	141	
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same	data	as	used	for	‘the	partner	choice	experiment’	in	(22)).	We	further	recorded	the	142	 location	of	all	nests	along	three	axis	(to	nearest	5cm)	allowing	us	to	calculate	the	143	 distances	between	nests	in	a	3D	space.		144	 Combining	the	two	field	seasons,	individuals	from	~200	of	these	nests	were	145	 collected	during	early	mornings,	before	sunrise	(6.00-7.00).	In	the	laboratory	we	gave	146	 each	wasp	a	unique	code	of	four	coloured	dots	on	her	thorax	using	enamel	paints;	147	 measured	the	length	of	one	of	her	wings	to	the	nearest	0.1	mm;	and	obtained	a	DNA	148	 sample	by	cutting	the	tarsus	from	a	middle	leg.	Tarsus	samples	were	kept	in	100%	149	 ethanol	at	~4°C	until	used	for	genotyping.	Wasps	were	released	close	to	their	nests	the	150	 same	morning	before	11.00.	When	wasps	were	permanently	removed	as	a	part	of	an	151	 experimental	treatment	they	were	either	freeze-killed	or	released	at	a	field	site	2.5km	152	 away:	none	returned	to	her	original	site.	153	
Experimental	setup		154	 The	day	after	nest	residents	were	marked	on	a	nest,	we	checked	the	nest	in	the	evening	155	 for	additional,	unmarked	residents.	Any	unmarked	residents	were	collected	the	156	 following	morning	and	marked	as	described	above.	Once	all	nest	residents	were	157	 marked,	we	started	daytime	and	evening	censuses.	Daytime	censuses	consisted	of	3-4	158	 spot-checks	per	day	(min.	30	min	between	each	census)	on	sunny	days	every	2-4	days,	159	 where	the	presence	or	absence	of	nest	residents	were	recorded	during	the	main	160	 foraging	period	(11.00-17.00).	From	the	daytime	censuses	we	identified	the	social	rank	161	 of	each	resident	in	the	linear	dominance	hierarchy:	the	dominant	breeder	spends	the	162	 most	time	on	the	nest	while	the	lowest	ranked	individual	spends	the	most	time	away	163	 from	the	nest	foraging	(45).		164	 In	the	evenings,	nest	residents	return	to	their	nests	for	the	night.	During	evening	165	 censuses	(18.00-20.00),	performed	every	2-4	days,	we	searched	focal	nests	for	new	166	
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joiners.	To	mark	a	new	joiner	with	minimal	disturbance,	we	carefully	applied	a	single	167	 pink	paint	dot	to	its	abdomen	while	it	was	on	the	nest	(day	0	of	the	Joiner	Experiment).	168	 We	videoed	a	subset	of	21	focal	nests	on	day	1	for	three	hours	during	the	main	foraging	169	 period	(11.00-17.00).	The	following	morning	(day	2),	we	caught	and	marked	the	joiner	170	 as	described	above.	On	day	3	we	confirmed	the	presence	of	the	joiner	during	an	evening	171	 census,	so	that	we	could	plan	to	apply	treatment	the	following	morning	(day	4;	172	 treatment	morning).	If	the	joiner	was	not	present	on	its	nest	during	one	of	these	checks,	173	 we	looked	for	it	on	the	nest	for	a	maximum	of	three	days.	If	the	joiner	re-appeared	174	 within	this	period	we	continued	with	the	next	step	of	the	procedure;	if	it	did	not	we	175	 resumed	normal	censuses	of	the	nest.		176	 	 On	the	morning	of	treatment	in	the	Joiner	Experiment,	we	applied	one	of	three	177	 treatments	(N	treated	focal	nests	=	62):	1)	Joiner’s	first	choice:	This	was	our	control	178	 treatment	where	the	joiner	was	allowed	to	stay	and	no	nest	residents	were	removed;	2)	179	
Joiner’s	second	choice:	We	removed	the	joiner’s	first	nest	choice	by	permanently	180	 removing	the	nest	and	all	of	its	residents,	while	immediately	releasing	the	joiner	itself.	If	181	 any	established	residents	were	absent	from	the	nest,	we	left	the	nest	in	situ	for	a	182	 maximum	of	48	hours	before	removing	it,	allowing	us	to	attract	and	remove	remaining	183	 residents;	3)	Joiner	removal:	We	permanently	removed	the	joiner	(or	both	joiners	if	184	 two	had	joined)	while	releasing	all	other	residents	near	to	the	nest.		185	 In	addition	to	applying	one	of	the	three	described	treatments,	we	also	recorded	186	 the	presence	of	all	residents	on	focal	nests	by	collecting	all	wasps	on	their	nest,	187	 recording	their	IDs,	and	releasing	individuals	immediately	according	to	treatment.	We	188	 further	performed	a	brood	census	on	each	focal	nest,	which	included	counting	the	189	 number	of	cells,	and	categorising	the	development	of	brood	within	each	cell.	Nest-level	190	 brood	values	were	later	summed	as	follows:	small	larva	(given	a	value	of	1.5),	medium	191	
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larva	(2),	large	larva	(3)	and	pupa	(4);	a	cell	without	a	larva	or	pupa	was	assumed	to	192	 contain	an	egg	(1).	193	 	 In	addition	to	the	Joiner	Experiment,	we	carried	out	a	Subordinate	Experiment	194	 similar	to	Treatment	2	(Joiner’s	second	choice),	but	using	established	low-ranking	195	 subordinates,	rather	than	new	joiners,	from	a	separate	set	of	nests.	In	each	of	34	nests	196	 that	had	not	received	joiners	during	our	observations,	we	chose	one	of	the	lowest	197	 ranking	subordinates	and	released	it	after	removing	the	nest	and	the	remaining	nest	198	 residents,	as	in	the	Joiner	Experiment,	Treatment	2.	199	 	 Following	the	treatments,	we	searched	for	released	joiners	and	subordinates	in	200	 all	nests	in	the	sub-populations	during	daytime	and	evening	censuses	every	2-4	days.	201	 When	a	released	individual	was	found	on	a	new	host	nest	with	unmarked	residents,	we	202	 waited	2-3	days	and	then	collected	and	marked	the	residents.	We	also	resumed	daytime	203	 censuses	on	all	focal	nests	(including	these	new	host	nests)	2-3	days	after	treatment,	204	 and	performed	brood	census	as	described	above	every	10-15	days.	We	discontinued	all	205	 censuses	on	a	nest	when	its	first	worker	matured.	206	
Video	analysis	207	 Each	video	was	watched	by	one	of	seven	people	who	recorded	when	nest	residents	left	208	 and	returned	to	the	nest,	and	all	behavioural	interactions.	Observers	were	all	trained	by	209	 one	person,	who	spot-checked	for	consistency.	Behavioural	interactions	were	ranked	210	 according	to	level	of	aggressiveness:	antennation	(given	a	value	of	1),	food	sharing	(2),	211	 and	aggression	(3;	including	all	more	aggressive	encounters	such	as	bite,	chew	and	212	 lunge).	Two	aggression	values	were	calculated	for	each	individual:	the	sum	of	values	for	213	 all	behaviours	initiated	and	the	sum	of	values	for	all	received	behaviours	during	the	full	214	 video	recording.		215	
	 10	
Foraging	returns	brought	back	to	the	nest	were	ranked	according	to	value	in	the	216	 following	way:	nothing	visible	(given	a	value	of	0),	nesting	material	(1),	liquid	food,	as	217	 evidenced	by	trophallaxing	(2),	or	a	solid	food	ball	(3).	Foraging	return	values	were	218	 calculated	for	each	individual	as	the	sum	of	values	during	the	full	video	recording.	219	
Genotyping	and	relatedness	220	 Protocols	were	identical	to	those	described	previously	(22).	Briefly,	DNA	was	extracted	221	 from	tarsus	samples	and	samples	were	genotyped	at	nine	microsatellite	loci	used	222	 previously	in	studies	of	the	same	population	(3,	22,	44,	46,	47).	Each	locus	had	between	223	 6	and	51	different	alleles	in	our	samples	(median	in	2013	=	13;	median	in	2014	=	11).	224	 All	loci	were	amplified	in	a	single	multiplex	reaction	using	the	Qiagen	multiplex	PCR	kit	225	 (Qiagen,	Venlo,	The	Netherlands).		226	 Relatedness	5.0.8	software	(48)	was	used	to	calculate	relatedness	between	227	 joiners	and	nest	residents	as	in	(22).	The	Full	Sibship	Reconstruction	procedure	in	228	 Kingroup	v2	software	(44,	49)	was	used	to	identify	groups	of	sisters	among	the	nests	in	229	 each	block	(primary	hypothesis:	haplodiploid	sisters;	null	hypothesis:	haplodiploid	230	 cousins)(3).	We	then	counted	the	number	of	sisters	each	resident	had	in	its	own	nest	231	 and	in	other	nests.	Only	individuals	with	at	least	6	out	of	9	loci	scored	successfully	were	232	 used	(median	number	of	successful	loci	per	sample	=	9);	1996	out	of	2011	wasps	were	233	 successfully	genotyped.	234	
Statistics	235	 All	statistical	analyses	were	performed	using	the	statistical	software	R	(50).	Whenever	236	 appropriate,	non-parametric	tests	were	used,	and	whenever	the	effect	of	more	than	one	237	 predictor	was	tested,	GLMs	(Generalized	Linear	Models)	or	GLMMs	(Generalized	Linear	238	 Mixed	Models)	were	used	(51).	For	count	data	we	used	poisson	error	and	tested	for	239	 overdispersion:	negative	binomial	error	was	used	if	models	were	overdispersed,	and	240	
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again	we	tested	to	ensure	these	models	were	no	longer	overdispersed	before	241	 proceeding.	For	models	with	continuous	data	we	used	a	Gaussian	error	structure	and	242	 checked	to	ensure	that	residuals	were	homogenous	and	normally	distributed.	Non-243	 significant	predictor	variables	(p	>	0.05)	were	removed	from	full	models	in	order	to	244	 obtain	more	reliable	p-values	for	the	remaining	predictors.	When	analysing	data	from	245	 video	recordings,	we	incorporated	nest	ID	and	the	ID	of	the	person	watching	the	video	246	 as	random	effects.	When	analysing	aggression	and	foraging	return	values	we	used	the	247	 glmmADMB	package	(52)	to	build	GLMMs	with	negative	binomial	error.	This	package	248	 further	allowed	us	to	account	for	zero-inflation	in	the	aggression	models.		249	
Results		250	
Joiners’	alternative	options		251	 We	permanently	removed	the	first	nest	choices	of	32	joiners	and	recovered	25	(78.1%)	252	 of	them	on	their	second	nesting	choices.	Of	these	25	second-choice	joiners,	18	joined	253	 other	established	nests,	3	initiated	new	nests	with	other	females,	3	joined	nests	of	254	 unknown	ages,	and	only	a	single	joiner	definitely	initiated	a	new	nest	alone.		255	 Out	of	21	second-choice	joiners	with	known	fates,	6	(28.6%)	became	the	256	 dominant	breeder	on	their	second-choice	nest	after	joining	or	initiating	it;	the	257	 remaining	15	(71.4%)	became	subordinates.	A	first-choice	joiner	became	the	dominant	258	 breeder	on	2	out	of	14	control	nests	(14.3%)	after	joining.	Thus,	more	joiners	tended	to	259	 become	dominant	through	their	second	nest	choice	than	through	their	first,	although	260	 this	difference	was	not	significant	(soon	after	joining:	Chi-squared	with	Yates’s	261	 correction	=	0.33,	df	=	1,	p	=	0.57;	at	worker	maturation:	Chi-squared	with	Yates’s	262	 correction	=	0.70,	df	=	1,	p	=	0.10).		263	
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Joiners’	second	choices	were	similar	to	their	first	choices	in	terms	of	other	264	 factors	expected	to	affect	fitness	payoffs:	Firstly,	there	was	no	difference	between	first-	265	 and	second-choice	joiners	in	the	social	rank	they	obtained	after	joining,	correcting	for	266	 group	size	(Fig	2a;	GLM,	poisson	error;	y	=	social	rank	after	treatment;	main	effects:	267	 treatment:	z	=	0.26,	p	=	0.80,	group	size:	z	=	3.32,	p	<	0.001,	interaction	between	268	 treatment	and	group	size:	z	=	0.95,	p	=	0.34,	N	=	36).	Secondly,	there	was	no	difference	269	 between	first-	and	second-choice	joiners	in	terms	of	the	joiners’	genetic	relatedness	to	270	 the	dominant	in	the	group	they	joined	(comparing	first-	and	second-choice	joiners	after	271	 treatment:	Mann-Whitney	U	test:	W	=	73,	p	=	0.64,	N	=	26;	comparing	second-choice	272	 joiners’	first	and	second	nest	choices:	Wilcoxon	Paired,	V	=	19,	p	=	0.95,	N	pairs	=	8),	or	273	 in	the	number	of	sisters	they	had	in	the	group,	correcting	for	group	size	(Fig	2b;	GLM,	274	 negative	binomial	error;	y	=	number	of	sisters	after	treatment;	main	effects:	first-	vs.	275	 second-choice	joiners:	z	=	0.038,	p	=	0.97,	group	size:	z	=	3.31,	p	<	0.001,	the	interaction	276	 between	treatment	and	group	size:	z	=	-1.41,	p	=	0.16,	N	=	40;	y	=	number	of	sisters	of	277	 second-choice	joiners;	main	effects:	first	vs.	second	choice:	z	=	-0.97,	p	=	0.33,	group	278	 size:	z	=	3.68,	p	<	0.001,	the	interaction	between	choice	and	group	size:	z	=	0.09,	p	=	279	 0.93,	N	=	22).	Thirdly,	there	was	no	difference	between	first-choice	joiners,	second-280	 choice	joiners	and	established	nest	residents	in	whether	they	stayed	in	their	groups	281	 until	worker	maturation	or	had	disappeared	by	this	stage	(Chi-square	=	1.42,	df	=	2,	p	=	282	 0.49;	first-choice	joiners:	14	out	of	20	(70.0%);	second-choice	joiners:	12	out	of	23	283	 (52.2%);	established	nest	residents:	84	out	of	141	(59.6%)	stayed	till	worker	284	 maturation).	285	 New	nests	of	second-choice	joiners	were	mainly	located	within	a	couple	of	286	 meters	of	first	nest	choices	(Fig	1;	median	=	1.21m,	mean	=	1.93m,	max.	=	8.9m).	Seven	287	 out	of	22	(31.8%)	second-choice	joiners	chose	the	closest	nest	(of	which	5	were	288	
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established	nests	and	2	were	newly	initiated).	It	was	relatively	common	for	wasps	to	289	 visit	other	nests	in	the	population.	We	spotted	194	of	the	1603	marked	wasps	in	the	290	 population	(12.1%)	on	at	least	two	different	nests.	Wasps	visited	nests	that	were	291	 located	up	to	54.6m	away	from	their	original	nests,	but	>95%	of	them	visited	within	a	292	 5m	radius	(median	distance	=	0.9m;	mean	distance	=	2.2m).	293	
Consequences	of	rejecting	a	joiner	for	established	nest	residents		294	 We	removed	one	or	two	joiners	from	each	of	16	joiner-removal	nests	(21	joiners	295	 removed).	After	treatment,	more	joiner-removal	nests	received	extra	joiners	(7	out	of	296	 16	nests:	43.8%)	than	did	control	nests	where	joiners	were	allowed	to	stay	(2	out	of	14	297	 nests:	14.3%).	However,	the	difference	in	number	of	extra	joiners	received	in	the	two	298	 treatments	was	not	significant	(Fig	3a;	Mann-Whitney	U	test:	W	=	91.5,	p	=	0.37,	N	=	30),	299	 and	the	extra	joiners	received	were	not	enough	to	replace	those	removed:	control	nests	300	 received	significantly	more	joiners	overall	(including	focal	joiners)	than	joiner-removal	301	 nests	did	excluding	removed	focal	joiners	(Fig	3b;	Mann-Whitney	U	test:	W	=	169,	p	=	302	 0.014,	N	=	30).		303	 	 Original	dominants	were	no	more	likely	to	lose	their	dominant	breeding	304	 positions	in	control	nests	where	joiners	were	allowed	to	stay	than	in	joiner-removal	305	 nests.	After	treatment,	the	dominant	lost	her	breeding	position	in	4	out	of	13	(30.8%)	306	 control	nests	and	in	4	out	of	15	(26.7%)	joiner-removal	nests	(Chi-square	with	Yates’s	307	
Correction	=	0,	df	=	1,	p	=	1).	Additionally,	established	nest	residents	were	no	more	likely	308	 to	leave	their	nests	after	a	joining	event	in	control	compared	to	joiner-removal	nests	309	 (Mann-Whitney	U	test:	W	=	116.5,	p	=	0.86,	N	nests	=	30).		310	 Nest	success,	measured	as	date	of	worker	maturation	and	as	brood	development	311	 at	worker	maturation,	was	not	affected	by	treatment	or	by	a	switch	in	the	dominant	312	 breeder’s	identity.	Only	the	number	of	nest	residents	and	brood	development	at	the	313	
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time	of	treatment	significantly	affected	brood	development	at	worker	maturation	(both	314	 effects	positive)	(GLM,	y	=	date	of	worker	emergence;	main	effects:	treatment:	t	=	-0.50,	315	
p	=	0.78,	dominance-usurpation:	t	=	1.51,	p	=	0.14,	group	size:	t	=	-0.94,	p	=	0.35,	brood	316	 value	at	joining:	t	=	-1.69,	p	=	0.10;	y	=	brood	value	at	worker	emergence;	main	effects:	317	 treatment:	t	=	0.45,	p	=	0.62,	dominance-usurpation:	t	=	0.79,	p	=	0.94,	group	size:	t	=	318	 3.59,	p	=	0.0012,	brood	value	at	joining:	t	=	4.64,	p	<	0.001;	N	nests	=	55).			319	
Behavioural	interactions	during	joining	events		320	 New	joiners	did	not	spend	more	time	foraging	than	established	subordinates,	correcting	321	 for	rank	(GLMM;	Gaussian	error;	y	=	time	spent	off	the	nest;	main	effects:	joiner	or	322	 subordinate:	Chi-sq	=	1.63,	p	=	0.20,	rank:	Chi-sq	=	95.57,	p	<	0.001).	However,	new	323	 joiners	brought	back	a	higher	total	value	of	foraging	items	than	established	324	 subordinates,	correcting	for	time	spent	foraging.	In	other	words,	forage	value	per	time	325	 unit	spent	foraging	was	higher	for	recent	joiners	than	for	established	subordinates.	The	326	 amount	of	aggression	that	a	joiner	received	also	tended	to	be	positively	correlated	with	327	 foraging	return	values,	while	relatedness	between	the	joiner	and	the	established	nest	328	 residents	had	no	effect	on	foraging	returns	(GLMM;	negative	binomial	error;	y	=	total	329	 foraging	return	value;	main	effects:	joiner	or	subordinate:	z	=	2.73,	p	=	0.0063,	330	 aggression	received:	z	=	1.71,	p	=	0.088,	time	spent	off	the	nest:	z	=	1.75,	p	=	0.080,	331	 average	relatedness	between	joiner	and	residents:	z	=	-1.47,	p	=	0.14).	Recent	joiners	332	 that	later	became	the	dominant	breeders	on	their	nests	worked	less	hard	during	video	333	 recordings	than	joiners	that	remained	subordinate	(N	=	19;	y	=	foraging	return	value	334	 per	time	unit;	Wilcoxon’s	W	=	8.5,	p	=	0.043).	335	 Joiners	neither	received	nor	initiated	more	aggression	than	other	nest	residents,	336	 and	average	relatedness	between	joiner	and	residents	did	not	affect	aggression	levels	337	 (GLMM;	negative	binomial	error;	y	=	aggression	received;	main	effects:	joiner	or	338	
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resident:	z	=	1.41,	p	=	0.16;	number	of	days	after	joining:	z	=	-0.20,	p	=	0.84;	relatedness	339	 between	joiner	and	residents:	z	=	0.33,	p	=	0.74;	time	spent	on	the	nest:	z	=	3.52,	p	<	340	 0.001;	y	=	aggression	initiated;	main	effects:	joiner	or	resident:	z	=	-1.11,	p	=	0.27,	341	 number	of	days	after	joining:	z	=	-0.83,	p	=	0.41,	relatedness	between	joiner	and	342	 residents:	z	=	0.22,	p	=	0.82,	time	spent	on	the	nest:	initiated:	z	=	10.19,	p	<	0.001;	N	343	
wasps	=	142,	N	nests	=	21).		344	
Established	subordinates’	alternative	options		345	 Of	34	released	subordinates,	we	relocated	18	(52.9%)	on	their	second	nesting	choices:	346	 10	joined	other	established	nests;	3	initiated	a	new	nest	with	each	other;	4	joined	nests	347	 that	could	have	been	either	established	or	new;	only	a	single	subordinate	nested	348	 solitarily	(taking	over	an	abandoned	nest).	As	with	the	second-choice	joiners,	the	349	 second	nesting	choices	of	released	low-ranking	subordinates	were	no	different	than	350	 their	first	choices	with	regard	to	inheritance	rank	obtained	and	presence	of	sisters	351	 (ranks:	Wilcoxon	paired,	V	=	63.5,	p	=	0.22,	N	=	15;	presence	of	sisters:	Chi-squared	with	352	 Yates’s	correction	=	0,	df	=	1,	p	=	1).	Released	subordinates	also	mainly	chose	their	new	353	 nests	within	a	couple	of	meters	(median	=	1.30m;	mean	=	1.42m;	max	=	3.37m).	354	
Discussion	355	
Joiners	had	high-payoff	alternative	options		356	 We	quantified	the	outside	options	available	to	cooperatively	breeding	paper	wasps,	P.	357	
dominula,	and	found	that	at	the	time	of	joining	a	nest,	individuals	had	alternative	358	 options	that	offered	potentially	high	fitness	payoffs.	After	we	experimentally	removed	359	 their	first	nest	choices,	joiners’	second	nesting	choices	included	a	>1:4	chance	of	360	 obtaining	the	dominant	breeding	position	in	a	social	group,	which	is	the	highest-payoff	361	 possible	in	this	species.	This	means	that	outside	options	offered	much	greater	fitness	362	
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payoffs	than	solitary	nesting:	at	our	field	site,	the	payoff	from	solitary	nesting	is	close	to	363	 zero	due	to	extremely	high	nest	failure	rates	(>90%	of	solitary	nests	fail	(3,	40,	53)).	364	 This	result	shows	clearly	that	partner	choice	in	P.	dominula	has	the	potential	to	affect	365	 payoff	distributions	in	models	predicting	the	amount	of	help	provided	by	subordinates	366	 (7,	21)	or	the	amount	of	reproduction	that	dominants	might	have	to	concede	to	retain	367	 helpers	(14,	42,	54).	Simply	comparing	payoffs	from	observed	helping	decisions	with	368	 those	from	a	default	solitary	breeding	option,	as	is	traditionally	done,	is	likely	to	greatly	369	 overestimate	the	relative	benefit	of	staying	and	helping	in	the	current	group.	When	370	 high-quality	outside	options	exist,	dominants	may	accept	a	lower	subordinate	work	371	 effort	than	traditional	models	would	predict.	Hence,	we	demonstrate	that	multiplayer	372	 models,	such	as	those	offered	by	biological	market	theory,	are	more	appropriate	than	373	 traditional	models	for	understanding	levels	of	help	in	cooperative	breeders	such	as	P.	374	
dominula	(7,	9,	21,	22).	375	
First	and	second	nest	choices	offered	similar	payoffs		376	 Joiners	and	established	subordinates	did	not	necessarily	have	to	settle	for	inferior	377	 payoff	options,	compared	to	their	first	nesting	choice,	when	forced	to	make	a	second	378	 choice,	contrary	to	our	predictions.	This	result	suggests	that	individuals	had	more	than	379	 one	relatively	high-quality	option	available	in	the	market.	We	found	that	direct	fitness	380	 returns	associated	with	the	chances	of	usurping	or	inheriting	the	breeding	position,	as	381	 well	as	indirect	fitness	returns	from	helping	a	related	dominant,	were	no	smaller	in	382	 second	choices	than	in	first	nesting	choices.	We	predicted	that	joiners	should	evaluate	383	 their	options	and	choose	the	one	that	offered	the	highest	fitness	payoff	(10,	21,	53).	384	 However,	joiners	may	have	insufficient	information	to	make	this	choice:	it	is	likely	385	 difficult	for	an	individual	to	evaluate	the	exact	chances	of	obtaining	the	breeding	386	 position	in	all	nests	in	the	market,	prior	to	actually	joining.	Furthermore,	there	is	little	387	
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evidence	that	females	can	discriminate	relatedness	at	the	individual	level	in	this	species	388	 (39,	44,	55)	and	thereby	preferentially	join	relatives	to	maximise	inclusive	fitness.	389	 Indeed,	both	joiners	and	subordinates	sometimes	chose	to	join	nests	without	sisters	390	 despite	having	sisters	in	nearby	nests.	These	results	suggest	that	joiners	chose	one	of	391	 several	options	available	to	them,	each	offering	relatively	high	payoffs,	indicating	that	392	 the	biological	market	is	large	(22).		393	
Rejecting	a	joiner	may	be	costly	for	dominant	breeders		394	 Experimentally	removed	joiners	could	not	easily	be	replaced	with	new	ones,	suggesting	395	 that	there	is	not	an	unlimited	pool	of	potential	joiners	in	the	population	(as	was	also	396	 found	in	Polistes	carolina	(20)).	Additionally,	nest	success	increased	with	the	number	of	397	 nest	residents,	substantiating	previous	findings	that	larger	groups	fare	better	(3,	40)	398	 and	that	it	is	in	the	interest	of	dominants	to	accept	joiners,	particularly	related	ones,	in	399	 order	to	increase	group	size.	Taken	together,	these	results	suggest	that,	as	we	predicted,	400	 it	may	be	costly	for	dominants	to	reject	joiners.	Supporting	this	result,	we	found	that	401	 original	dominants	were	no	more	likely	to	lose	their	dominant	breeding	positions	when	402	 joiners	were	allowed	to	stay,	compared	with	when	joiners	were	removed.	Hence,	by	403	 accepting	a	joiner,	an	original	dominant	does	not	necessarily	incur	a	cost	in	terms	of	an	404	 increased	risk	of	nest	usurpation,	as	she	already	faces	a	risk	of	losing	her	breeding	405	 position	to	one	of	her	established	subordinates.	Allowing	joiners	to	stay	also	did	not	406	 generally	make	established	subordinates	more	likely	to	leave.	407	 We	thus	propose	that	a	dominant	cannot	afford	to	be	too	‘choosy’	when	408	 presented	with	potential	joiners:	it	is	in	her	interest	to	increase	group	size	(3),	so	long	409	 as	the	risk	of	the	joiner	usurping	dominance	is	not	too	high.	This	potentially	makes	410	 joiners	the	‘choosers’	in	the	market	(10),	so	that	dominants	are	effectively	competing	411	 with	each	other	to	attract	a	limited	supply	of	joiners	(22).	Dominants	may	therefore	be	412	
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prepared	to	accept	a	reduced	workload	from	subordinates	in	order	to	retain	them	when	413	 competition	for	help	increases	in	the	population.	414	
Joiners	may	pay	for	group	membership	415	 Rather	than	using	aggression,	joiners	may	have	used	appeasement	in	the	form	of	pay-416	 to-stay	in	order	to	become	accepted	in	their	new	nests.	Within	the	first	few	days	of	417	 joining,	we	found	that	joiners	provided	higher	value	forage	than	other	subordinates	on	418	 their	nests,	perhaps	to	“pay”	for	acceptance	by	the	group.	Furthermore,	joiners	were	not	419	 involved	in	a	disproportionate	number	of	aggressive	interactions,	contrary	to	what	420	 would	be	expected	if	they	were	‘forcing’	their	acceptance	as	new	residents.	These	421	 results	render	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	subordinates	trade	helping	behaviour	in	422	 return	for	group	membership	(15):	when	first	arriving	at	a	nest,	a	joiner	may	need	to	423	 prove	her	worth	and	convey	she	does	not	represent	a	high	risk	of	usurping	the	breeding	424	 position	(15,	32).		425	 	 An	alternative	to	the	general	idea	that	a	joiner	works	in	exchange	for	group	426	 membership	is	that	she	works	simply	because	any	investment	in	the	nest	would	directly	427	 benefit	her	if	she	later	took	over	the	dominant	breeding	position	herself	(‘group	428	 augmentation’	(56)).	However,	our	findings	do	not	support	the	hypothesis	that	429	 subordinates	are	maximising	only	group	augmentation	benefits,	because	joiners	that	430	 later	became	dominants	worked	less	hard	than	those	that	remained	subordinate.	This	is	431	 consistent	with	previous	findings	that	group	members	higher	up	the	hierarchy,	and	432	 therefore	more	likely	to	inherit	the	dominant	position,	in	fact	work	less	hard	than	433	 lower-ranked	subordinates	(45).		434	
Sampling	costs	and	prospecting	435	 Given	that	experimentally	presented	foreign	conspecifics	are	normally	attacked	by	nest	436	 residents	(44),	the	lack	of	aggression	towards	new	joiners	suggests	that	residents	may	437	
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have	already	been	familiar	with	joiners,	perhaps	through	previous	visits	by	joiners	to	438	 establish	familiarity	via	‘prospecting	behaviour’	(11,	57).	Individuals	in	cooperative	439	 species	may	benefit	from	maintaining	a	social	network	outside	their	current	groups,	by	440	 visiting	and	familiarising	themselves	with	members	of	other	groups.	This	prospecting	441	 behaviour	can	provide	them	with	information	about	whether	between-group	dispersal	442	 would	be	beneficial,	and	maximise	their	chances	of	being	accepted	in	the	new	group,	443	 should	they	be	expelled	from	their	current	group,	choose	to	leave	or	if	their	nest	fails	444	 (11,	57,	58).	Indeed,	nests	fail	at	high	rates	in	P.	dominula	(3,	40),	and	prospecting	445	 behaviour	may	be	common:	we	spotted	12.1%	of	marked	wasps	on	at	least	two	446	 different	nests.	This	number	is	similar	to	previous	studies	of	the	same	population	447	 (~16%	in	(40)	and	~14%	in	(22)).		448	 	 However,	prospecting	behaviour	is	likely	to	be	costly	(59):	visiting	other	groups	449	 requires	time	and	energy	that	could	otherwise	be	spent	foraging.	These	costs,	called	450	 sampling	costs	or	searching	costs	in	biological	market	terms	(9,	10),	are	likely	to	limit	451	 the	number	of	groups	a	subordinate	wasp	can	maintain	in	its	social	network.	Second	452	 choice	joiners	mainly	chose	options	that	were	nearby.	This	may	partly	be	because	nests	453	 containing	genetic	relatives	tend	to	be	nearby,	but	greater	costs	of	prospecting	further	454	 afield	could	also	contribute.	In	a	scenario	where	sampling	costs	are	very	high,	for	455	 example	in	a	very	low-density	population	where	maintaining	peaceful	relationships	456	 with	distant	neighbouring	groups	would	pose	a	high	risk	of	predation	or	great	energetic	457	 expenditure,	market	forces	could	fail	to	operate,	as	there	might	effectively	be	no	outside	458	 options	available	(10).	Hence,	quantifying	sampling	costs	and	documenting	the	actual	459	 social	networks	that	individuals	gain	through	prospecting	is	an	important	avenue	for	460	 further	studies	in	this	system.		461	
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Conclusion	462	
Invoking	biological	market	models	to	include	outside	options	463	 Our	key	finding	is	that	in	a	cooperatively	breeding	paper	wasp,	P.	dominula,	both	new	464	 joiners	and	established	subordinates	have	alternative	nesting	options	that	offer	fitness	465	 payoffs	comparable	to	their	first	nest	choices	and	that	are	higher	than	the	payoff	466	 through	solitary	nesting.	The	existence	of	multiple	options	with	similar	payoffs	has	467	 important	implications	for	the	conditions	that	subordinates	should	accept	in	their	468	 groups;	or	in	biological	market	terms,	the	deal	settled	on	between	trading	partners.	For	469	 example,	high-quality	outside	options	will	affect	the	trade	value	of	helping	behaviour	470	 and	therefore	influence	how	much	help	subordinates	are	prepared	to	provide	with	471	 rearing	the	dominant’s	offspring	(22).	Outside	options	may	also	determine	whether	472	 subordinates	should	demand	a	share	of	the	reproduction	in	return	for	their	services	in	473	 species	where	reproductive	concessions	are	likely	to	occur	(23,	60,	61).	Hence,	our	474	 findings	clearly	suggest	that	biological	market	models	are	indeed	necessary	for	475	 understanding	helping	behaviour	in	P.	dominula.	This	result	is	relevant	for	a	wide	range	476	 of	cooperatively	breeding	species	where	successful	dispersal	amongst	groups	occurs	477	 (for	example	cichlids	(11),	carrion	crows	(62),	dwarf	mongooses	(60),	and	baboons	478	 (63)).	Unlike	traditional	models,	which	assume	that	a	subordinate’s	only	alternative	is	479	 solitary	breeding,	market	models	allow	for	partner	choice,	partner	switching	and	480	 competition	for	partners	(9,	10).	To	conclude,	traditional	cooperative	theory	and	481	 reproductive	skew	models	are	therefore	likely	to	overestimate	subordinates’	propensity	482	 to	stay	and	help	in	their	group,	overestimate	the	level	of	help	that	they	provide,	and	483	 perhaps	underestimate	the	level	of	reproductive	concession	the	dominant	should	offer	484	 her	helpers.	Future	studies	should	identify	and	quantify	the	alternative	options	485	
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available	and	include	these	in	models	predicting	the	rate	of	exchange	of	cooperative	486	 behaviours	within	groups.		487	
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Figure	Legends	658	 	659	
Fig	1	Map	of	nests	and	second-choice	joiners’	moves:	Map	of	all	nests	in	the	three	660	 subpopulations	used	during	two	different	field	season	in	2013	(left	hand	and	middle	661	 sections)	and	2014	(right	hand	section).	Cactus	hedges	are	indicated	in	green	and	nests	662	 as	white	Xs.	Second-choice	joiners’	first	nest	choices	are	indicated	in	yellow	and	their	663	 second	choices	in	red,	with	an	arrow	connecting	the	two.		664	 	665	
Fig	2	Joiners	in	their	first	and	second	nest	choices:	Rank	obtained	by	joiners	(a)	and	666	 the	number	of	sisters	(b)	in	their	first-choice	(blue)	and	second-choice	nests	(red);	667	 points	have	been	slightly	jittered	along	the	X-axis.	Grey	lines	indicate	the	parameter	668	 space	boundaries:	if	dots	lie	on	the	horizontal	lines,	a	joiner	had	become	the	dominant	669	 breeder,	i.e.	rank	1,	(a)	or	had	zero	sisters	in	its	nest	(b);	if	dots	lie	on	the	steep	lines,	670	 joiners	had	become	the	lowest	ranked	individuals	(a)	or	had	only	sisters	in	the	group	671	 (b).	Stippled	lines	indicate	simple	regression	lines	for	first-choice	(blue)	and	second-672	 choice	(red)	joiners.		673	 	674	
Fig	3	Number	of	joiners	in	focal	nests:	The	number	of	joiners	received	in	first-choice	675	 (control)	nests	and	in	joiner-removal	nests:	(a)	The	number	of	extra	joiners	that	arrived	676	 after	treatment;	(b)	The	total	number	of	joiners	received,	including	the	treatment-677	 joiners	in	control	nests	but	excluding	them	in	joiner-removal	nest.		678	
	679	
